Knowledge Centre.

In the UK we all have a defined legal Right to Privacy (Article 8 ECHR Act 1998) and protection from harassment/stalking. That Right is reduced if there is reasonable suspicion of involvement in crime and/or specific other matters. Even so, the surveillance methods used need to be a proportionate response to the matter being investigated and necessary to prove involvement. If the investigation meets this threshold the use of a device providing geographic information only is unlikely to be assessed as a disproportionately intrusive tactic, provided it is only deployed for the time necessary to acquire the required information and does not accrue private information on any other unconnected individual. It is worth highlighting key considerations at this point. The device only provides information on the device, evidentially this is weak. For example, a car with a tracking device installed reports solely on the movements of the device (car), it does not identify who is using the car. The device will require monitoring, maintaining and retrieval. There are costs attributed to this. Balancing the intelligence requirement against privacy rights. In the absence of specific legislation governing private sector surveillance activity there are a number of interpretations associated with the deployment of tracking devices. Our opinion, based on over twenty years experience of delivering surveillance within a legal framework is tracking devices, when deployed legitimately, accrue far less (private) information than physical surveillance (the deployment of a conventional surveillance team/operatives). The justification threshold for both tactics is the same. In summary, tracking devices can be a useful tactic in building intelligence assessments and in assisting conventional surveillance teams. Used in isolation the information provided by them is uncorroborated, evidentially weak and specific to the device. There are other legal considerations including how the device is deployed and handling the information it provides.

Our surveillance operatives and teams are only available for daily or weekly tasking. Whilst tasked to a project they are unavailable for further tasking and committed to meeting client objectives. A working day is a consecutive ten hour period within twenty four hours. Teams and operatives often work beyond their working day to meet objectives.

Yes, if your previous surveillance provider has encountered problems achieving your objectives we can help. Our teams can mitigate anti surveillance and identify counter surveillance HOWEVER, please consider. Any observations that follow a surveillance compromise will almost certainly only evidence the changes in a subject's behaviour resulting from that compromise and may be unlikely to meet the initial objectives for some time.

We provide the most experienced and capable surveillance personnel available to the private / commercial sector supported by leading edge technologies and administration processes delivering integrity and excellence. The most proficient operational team, delivering the most comprehensive surveillance product. Surveillance, professionally.

Interception of communications is a criminal offence in the UK. This includes opening mail, listening/recording/monitoring phone calls, and accessing unopened voicemail/messages/emails. Business communications monitoring is lawful.

Behavioural sciences have been a prominent factor in Government security and surveillance operations for many years. Commercially the uptake has been slow, perhaps through a misunderstanding of the capabilities of detection officers and how their skills in interpreting human interactions within certain environments can provide critical warning of hostile intent, detect and preempt criminal activity and identify hostile reconnaissance. It is also indispensable in providing protective and counter surveillance services. Following a sharp increase in terrorist activity in the UK and specifically the mass casualty attack at Manchester Arena in May 2017, the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, also known as Martyn's Law is currently before Parliament and likely to become legislation this year (2024). This will place a legal obligation on venues to strengthen the security of public events, take steps to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack and reduce harm should an attack take place. Prevention and early detection is a key component in keeping the public safe and where professionally trained and experienced behavioural detection officers are an invaluable asset within wider security arrangements. We provide the only Covert Behavioural Detection Officers commercially available in the UK. Their counter terrorism, risk assessment and mitigation experience is substantial. Deploying seamlessly in support of existing security teams they provide a wealth of experience in terrorist methodology, attack planning, contingencies, emergency service responses and interoperability.

Behavioural Detection Red Teams provide venues, premises and retail centres with the necessary opportunity to examine their behavioural detection capability, assess its effectiveness specifically within relevant environments and how this function integrates into existing security arrangements. Where the facility exists to utilise temporary structures such as knife arches or manned security cordons, assessment of where and how these can be used to enhance indications. Behavioural detection will only be as effective as the training undertaken, capability of staff in applying theoretical knowledge gained through that training to real world situations, security processes aligned to rapidly respond to BDO concerns and internal administration processes to record, monitor and evaluate relevant information. Our Behavioural Detection Red Team are the only covert behavioural detection officers (CBDOs) available in the commercial / private sector. Their experience in Counter Terrorism covert operations is substantial. Working with venues we can provide bespoke evaluation opportunities based in real world experience. What does hostile reconnaissance really look like? What behaviours are exhibited by those intent on achieving their aims? What differences are there in terrorist methodology? How will you respond, coordinate resources and mitigate risk when faced with suspected threat? We can help.